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Case No. 7918 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELWOOD BOWMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
[NORMAN D. HAYWARD], HART-
FORD ACCIDENT & INDEM-
NITY COMPANY, GEORGE 
BECKSTEAD, and UN I T ED 
STATES FIDELITY AND GUAR-
ANTEE COMPANY, 
Defendants and .Appellwnts. 
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Rr.<"~l' ;: ~-, L.l•:_ ' ,. ·-
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.... ..----\ ·l:,~·--,_,MOSS & HYDE F' \l.J. ~" ·· Attorneys for.Ar:ellants: 
1\ p R ~ \ ~ ~ .:J 430 Judge ~uilding, 
--·--------·-.Salt Lake C1ty, Utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EL\VOOD BO,Y)L\N, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
[NOR:JIAN D. HAY\VARD], HART-
FORD ACCIDENT & INDE:JI-
NITY COMPANY, GEORGE 
BECKSTEAD, and UN I T E D 
STATES FIDELITY AND GUAR-
ANTEE CO~IPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7918 
This is an appeal by defendants Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Company, George Beckstead, and United 
States Fidelity and Guarantee Company from the lower 
Court's Order awarding a "reasonable attorney's fee" 
in the amount of $25 to defendant Beckstead and refus-
ing to award any attorney's fee to defendants Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Company and United States Fidel-
ity and Guarantee Company. Norman Hayward, de-
fendant below, does not appeal and is not a party here. 
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Plaintiff filed a joint and several action in the District 
Court to recover damages in the mnount of $10,000 and 
attorney's fees against four separate defendants for an 
alleged assault and battery (Tr. 1, 2). Defendant Hay-
ward was a deputy sheriff of Salt Lake County at the 
time of the alleged incident. Defendant Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Company had issued a Surety Bond 
running to George Beckstead, Sheriff, and conditioned 
upon the faithful performance of the office of Deputy 
Sheriff by defendant Hayward (Tr. ·224). Defendant 
Beckstead was Sheriff of Salt Lake County. Defendant 
United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company had 
issued a Surety Bond running to Salt Lake County and 
conditioned upon faithful performance of the office of 
Sheriff by defendant Beckstead (Tr. 224). All four de-
fendants answered. Each denied liability and prayed for 
a dismissal of the action and for their costs and for 
attorney's fees of $1,000.00 pursuant to Section 104-
44-22 U.C.A. 1943. 
The case was tried to a jury which rendered its 
verdict against defendant Hayward in his personal 
capacity and not as a deputy sheriff and assessed 
damages of $150.00 against Hayward (Tr. 195-A). No 
verdict was found against defendants Hartford, Beck-
stead, and U.S.F.&G. who were exonerated (Tr. 195-C). 
Th~reupon defendants Hartford, Beckstead, and 
U.S.F.&G. each for himself petitioned the Court for 
Judgment on the Verdict for attorney's fees as prayed 
in their answer and as provided by Sec. 104-44-22, U.C.A. 
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19-!3. The Court awarded attorney's fees to defendant 
Beckstead in the au10unt of $~5 and refused to award 
any attorney's fees to defendants Hartford and 
U.S.F.&G. (Tr. ~0:2). Thereafter testimony was taken by 
the Court regarding the legal ~ervices rendered to said 
defendants by their coun~el in defending the action 
(Tr. 7, 8, 9), but no modification, recision or other change 
was made in the Court's Order. 
(NOTE: Although the record is silent on the award 
of $25 as reasonable attorney's fee to defendant Beck-
stead, such order was made in open Court). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN AWARDING TO 
DEFENDANT GEORGE BECKSTEAD AS A REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE THE SUM OF $25. 
II. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY 
WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR 
DEFENDING THE ACTION. 
III. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE COM-
PANY WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S 
FEE FOR DEFENDING THE ACTION. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
ARGUMENT 
Point number II and Point number III will not be 
argued separately. Each involves the identical point of 
law and will be discussed together under Point II. 
I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN AWARDING TO 
DEFENDANT GEORGE BECKSTEAD AS A REASON ABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE THE SUM OF $25. 
What is a "reasonable attorney's fee"¥ Obviously, 
the term is relative and must vary from time to time 
and for place to place. Moreover, the term is not precise 
and within its scope many different fees could be set 
without violating the qualifying adjective "reasonable." 
However, we are not entirely without standards to apply 
and the Court below in refusing to apply any of these 
standards acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The case 
of Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207 
P. (2d) 178 has to do with reasonableness of an attor-
ney's fee as fixed by the Industrial Commissio!l. In 
that case counsel petitioned for a re-hearing on an un-
favorable decision of the Industrial Commission. When 
re-hearing was denied, certiorari was granted by the 
Supreme Court and upon hearing there the decision of 
the Commission was set aside. Then the Commission 
awarded benefits of $7,250 to the widow of deceased 
and ordered that $375 be paid to counsel for the widow 
as compensation for their services, although counsel 
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and their client had agreed upon a contingent fee of 
$1,000. This award of counsel fees was then brought 
before the Suprmne Court on certiorari. Other questions 
dealing with constitutionality were raised in the Supreme 
Court but the question of the anwunt of a reasonable 
attorney's fee was also raised and the Court discussed 
at length the factors to be considered in fixing a reason-
able attorney's fee: 
"In detennining the amount of the fee, it is 
proper to consider: (1) the time and labor re-
quired, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved and the skill requisite properly to con-
duct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance of ern-
ployment in the particular case will preclude the 
lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to 
arise out of the transaction, and in which there is 
a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would 
be employed, or will involve the loss of other 
en1ployment while employed in the particular case 
or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the cus-
tomary charges of the Bar for similar services; 
( 4) the amount involved in the controversy and 
for the benefits resulting to the client from the 
services; ( 5) the contingency or the certainty 
of the compensation; and ( 6) the character of 
the employment, whether casual or for an estab-
lished and constant client. No one of these con-
siderations in itself is controlling. They are mere 
guides in ascertaining the real value of the serv-
ice. 
"In deterrnining the customary charges of 
the Bar for similar services, it is proper for a 
lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees 
adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer 
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would permit himself to be controlled thereby 
or to follow it as his sole guide in determining 
the amount of his fee." Thatcher v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. 
In the case at bar, counsel were precluded from 
testifying as to any contract with their clients as to 
amount of the agreed attorney's fee, although an effort 
was made so to do. Moreover, the record does not dis-
close that the agreed fee was contingent upon success. 
Counsel were prepared to show both facts. After the 
Court's judgment on damages was entered, defendants 
petitioned for judgment on the verdict for attorney's 
fees in accordance with Section 1.04-44-22 U.C.A. 1943. 
This petition was made separately by defendants Beck-
stead (Tr. 196), Hartford (Tr. 197), and U.S.F.&G. (Tr. 
198). The Court denied the petitions of Hartford and 
U.S.F.&G. for attorney's fees (Tr. 202). Upon request 
of counsel for said defendants some testimony was heard 
but the Court never rescinded, modified or re-affirmed 
his Order (Tr. 10). Thereafter, counsel moved the court 
to reconsider the motion to fix attorney's fees and to 
hear additional evidence (Tr. 199, 200, 201). Pursuant 
to notice, counsel for both sides appeared before the 
Court prepared to present evidence but the Court sum-
marily refused to hear further evidence and denied the 
motions (Tr. 204). It is submitted that the Court acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to hear evidence 
upon which to base his ruling as to reasonable attorney's 
fees. Further, it is submitted that the Court failed to 
consider the proper factors in setting the' amount of the 
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attorney's fee as is apparent fron1 the award of $25 to 
defendant Beckstead and nothing to defendants B:artford 
and U.S.F.&G. If an attorney's fee of $375 was unreason-
ably low in' the Thatcher case and if $1,000 was "within 
the range between the highest and lowest reasonable-
ness" it is clear beyond question that $25 for defendant 
Beckstead is unreasonably low in this case and that no 
attorney's fee at all for defendants Hartford and 
U.S.F.&G. is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 
Counsel for defendants have been unable to find a 
Utah case squarely in point on the amount of a reason-
able attorney's fee under Section 104-44-22. However, 
at approximately the same time that this case was heard 
by one Judge of the District Court, these counsel were 
engaged in defending a similar action against this same 
Sheriff and his bonding company before another Judge 
of the District Court. (Herrara v. United States Fidelity 
and Guarantee Co. et al. Case No. 96489 in the District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah). 
In the latter case counsel prepared and filed an answer 
and took the deposition of plaintiff. Shortly thereafter 
plaintiff moved to dismiss his action which motion was 
granted by the Court. Counsel for defendants then 
moved the Court to fix a reasonable attorney's fee under 
Section 104-44-22. A'fter hearing testimony and argu-
ment the Court set $200 as a reasonable attorney's fee, 
which amount was paid from the cash undertaking posted 
by plaintiff at the commencement of the action. It is 
not contended here that this amount is in any way bind-
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ing on another Judge of the same Court nor upon this 
Court, but it is recited here by way of contrast. In the 
H errara case the matter never even reached the trial 
stage; while in the present case counsel conducted a two 
day jury trial and achieved an exoneration of their 
clients from liability in a law suit for $10,000 and attor-
ney's fees. 
Counsel for defendants are both members in good 
standing of the Utah State Bar. They maintain law 
offices in Salt Lake City and engage in the general prac-
tice of law in Utah and elsewhere. Both are members 
of the Salt Lake County Bar. Like every practicing 
lawyer everywhere, their time, training and skill are 
their stock in trade for which they are entitled to reason-
able compensation to pay the rent, the stenographer, the 
telephone and all the other overhead of a law office, as 
well as to pay the grocery bills and rent at home. In this 
case the record shows that counsel expended from their 
"stock in trade" time and training and skill to: 
1. File an answer for each defendant. 
2. File a motion to dismiss as to Hartford 
and U.S.F.&G. 
3. Appear in Court and argue the motions 
to dismiss. 
4. Take the deposition of plaintiff Bowman. 
5. Appear and participate in the taking of 
the deposition of defendant Hayward and witness 
Treseder. 
6. Interview all prospective witnesses. 
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7. Exan1ine the location of the alleged inci-
dent. 
S. File a Inotion challenging the undertaking 
filed by plain tiff. 
9. Appear in court to argue said motion. 
10. Represent defendants (successfully) 
during two days of jury trial. 
11. File n1otions for judgment on the ver-
dict. 
12. ..A.ppear in court and argue said motions. 
It seems patent from this list of activities that any 
reasonable person, whether an attorney or not, must 
conclude that $25.00 is not a "reasonable" amount to 
compensate a firm of attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
A.D. 1952 for services performed in successfully defend-
ing their clients in a $10,000 law suit. 
The Court's attention is directed to a suggested 
minimum fee schedule published in the Utah Bar Bul-
letin, Vol. XXII, Nos. 1-3, January-March 1952, at page 
13 et seq. Paragraph XI of said schedule indicates that 
the minimum fee per day in district court varies from 
$50 per day to $250 per day. The minimum fee for a 
default divorce is $150 (Par. XII) and an appearance 
before an administrative commission ranges from $50 
to $250 (XX). It is not suggested that said minimum fees 
are binding or controlling on the District Judge in set-
ting a "reasonable attorney's fee" but certainly this 
schedule furnishes a standard in this County and State. 
See: Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, supra .. 
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II. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COlVIP ANY 
WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR 
DEFENDING THE ACTION. 
III. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE COM-
PANY WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S 
FEE FOR DEFENDING THE ACTION. 
Plaintiff brought his action against each of four 
defendants-jointly and severally. He devoted a sep-
arate paragraph to each one and alleged liability in 
each. And against each one he sought damages of 
$10,000.00 and "a reasonable attorney's fee." Summons 
was served on each defendant and each was compelled 
to answer or to suffer an adverse judgment by default. 
Each of the four defendants separately retained counsel 
to defend the action. In their answer the four defendants 
each prayed for dismissal of the action, for their costs, 
and for "$1,000 attorney's fee in accordance with S.ection 
104-44-22, Utah Code Annotated 1943" which fee was 
less than 10% of the amount for which each defendant 
was being sued. 
Section 104-44-22, U.C.A.1943 reads: 
"In any action brought against any sheriff, 
constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any 
other person charged with the duty of enforce-
ment of the criminal laws of this state, or service 
of civil process, when any such action arises out 
of, or in the course of, the performance of his 
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duty, or in any action upon the bond of any such 
officer, the prevailing party therein shall, in addi-
tion to an award of costs a::; otherwise provided 
by law, recover fr01n the losing party therein 
such sun1 as counsel fees as shall be allowed by 
the court. The official bond of any such officer 
shall be liable for any such costs and attorney's 
fees. Before any such action if filed, and as a con-
dition precedent thereto, the proposed plaintiff 
shall prepare and file with, and at the time of 
filing, the complaint in any such action, a written 
undertaking with at least two sufficient sureties 
in an amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned 
upon the diligent prosecution of such action, and, 
in the event judgment in the said cause shall be 
against the plaintiff, for the payment to the de-
fendant of all costs and expenses that may be 
awarded against such plaintiff, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court." 
It will be noted: 
( 1) That in any action upon the bond of any 
sheriff or peace officer the prevailing party "shall 
* * * recover from the losing party therein * * * 
counsel fees * * * ." 
(2) That any plaintiff filing suit against a 
sheriff or peace officer must furnish a written 
undertaking "and, in the event judgment in the 
said cause shall be against the plaintiff [said 
undertaking shall stand] for the payment to the 
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be 
awarded against such plaintiff, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court." 
Surely it cannot be denied that this is an action 
"upon the bond" of the sheriff and of his deputy sheriff. 
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Nor can it be denied that Hartford and U.S.F.&G. were 
"prevailing parties." Therefore, plaintiff Bowman was 
the "losing party" as against these defendant-appellants. 
Therefore, pursuant to Section 104-44-22, the plaintiff 
must pay to defendants "all costs and expenses * * * 
including a reas·onable attorney's fee * * * ." 
It does not seem necessary to argue that no fee at 
all is not a "reasonable attorney's fee." 
Suppose, for argument, that the verdict had been 
for plaintiff and against all defendants, would not each 
defendant have been liable severally not only for dam-
ages assessed, but for counsel fees as well1 Plaintiff 
prayed for attorney's fees against each defendant under 
the statutory authority of Section 104-44-22. Had the 
verdict been for him he would have recovered also his 
attorney's fees. Therefore, by the authority of the same 
statute, since the verdict was against plaintiff and in 
favor of Hartford and U.S.F.&G., plaintiff must pay 
to these defendants "a reasonable attorney's fee." Each 
defendant was compelled to retain counsel to defend 
the action filed against him. By law, each, having pre-
vailed in the action, is entitled to recover from plaintiff 
his expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the trial court fixing attorney's fees 
for appellants should be reversed and set aside as arbi-
trary and capricious and the cause should be remanded 
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with directions to hear evidence and thereafter fix a 
reasonable attorney's fee for each appellant. Defend-
ants-appellants should be awarded costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOSS & HYDE, 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
430 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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